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1. Introduction
Mixed equilibria in contests of the generalized Tullock form, for which win-
ning probabilities depend on the ratio of resources expended, have recently
received much attention from theorists (Baye et al., 1994; Alcade and Dahm,
2010; Ewerhart, 2015, 2017a, 2017b; Feng and Lu, 2017). There is another
appealing class of contests, however, where the winning probabilities depend
instead on the difference of resources expended (Hirshleifer, 1989; Skaper-
das, 1996; Baik, 1998; Che and Gale, 2000). In particular, Hirshleifer’s
framework has its merits for the analysis of military combat (Dupuy, 1987;
Hirshleifer, 2000). Notwithstanding, the nature of mixed equilibria in that
model has remained poorly understood.
In this paper, we prove uniqueness of the equilibrium in the symmetric
two-player Hirshleifer contest, and offer a characterization of the mixed equi-
librium. It is shown that the support of the symmetric equilibrium strategy
is finite and includes the origin. Moreover, the cardinality of the support
grows over any finite bound as the decisiveness parameter goes to infinity.
Further, we show that the undissipated rent converges to zero as the de-
cisiveness parameter goes to infinity, and that ex-post overdissipation may
occur. We conclude by extending the uniqueness result to a larger class of
contests.
The uniqueness result is stated in Section 2, and proven in Section 3.
Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium. Rent dissipation is dealt with in
Section 5. Section 6 discusses ex-post overdissipation. Alternative contest
technologies are considered in Section 7.
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2. Statement of the uniqueness result
The Hirshleifer contest is specified as follows. Each of two players i ∈ {1, 2}
expends resources xi ≥ 0 in an attempt to win a prize of normalized value







1 + exp(α(xj − xi))
− xi, (2)
where j ∈ {1, 2} with j 6= i, and α > 0 measures the decisiveness of the
difference-form contest. In particular, for α→∞, payoffs converge to those
of the all-pay auction.
Any bid exceeding one is strictly dominated. We therefore define a mixed
strategy for player i as a probability measure µi on the Borel subsets of [0, 1].
The set of mixed strategies for player i will be denoted by M , where pure
strategies xi ∈ [0, 1] are interpreted as Dirac measures, as usual. Each player
i’s expected payoff is well-defined for any (µi, µj) ∈M ×M , and will, with
some abuse of notation, be denoted by Πi(µi, µj). An equilibrium is a pair
µ∗ = (µ∗1, µ
∗




j ) ≥ Πi(µi, µ
∗
j ) for any i, j ∈ {1, 2}
with j 6= i, and for any µi ∈M .
Proposition 1. For any α > 0, the Hirshleifer contest with parameter α
has a unique equilibrium.
3. Proof of Proposition 1
Equilibrium existence is known (cf. Hirshleifer, 1989, fn. 12). The proof of
uniqueness starts from the following observation.
Lemma 1. Let µ = (µ1, µ2) ∈ M ×M . Then, for any i, j ∈ {1, 2} with
j 6= i, the set of maximizers Xi(µ) = argmaxx̃i∈[0,1]Πi(x̃i, µj) is finite.
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Proof. The proof is a straightforward adaption of Ewerhart (2015, Th.
3.2), and therefore omitted.1 
Next, we show the following.




∗) is nonempty, and contains
the support of any equilibrium strategy (for both players).
Proof. Take an equilibrium µ∗ = (µ∗1, µ
∗
2). Clearly, the support of µ
∗
1
is a subset of X1(µ∗). Let µ∗∗ = (µ∗∗1 , µ
∗∗
2 ) be an arbitrary equilibrium.
Then, since equilibria in two-player contests are interchangeable (Ewerhart,
2017b, Appendix), (µ∗1, µ
∗∗
2 ) is an equilibrium. Therefore, the support of µ
∗
1
is a subset of X1(µ∗1, µ
∗∗




2 ) = X1(µ
∗∗). Hence, the support
of µ∗1 is contained inX1(µ
∗∗) for any equilibrium µ∗∗. In particular, Xα 6= ∅.
The second claim follows by symmetry. 
Denote byK = |Xα| the number of elements ofXα. Thus,Xα = {z1, ..., zK},
where z1 > z2 > ... > zK . Suppose first that K = 1. Then, the equilib-
rium is obviously unique. Suppose next that K ≥ 2. Fix some equilibrium
µ∗ = (µ∗1, µ
∗




i ({zm}) ≥ 0 denote the weight assigned by µ
∗
j
to zm, for j ∈ {1, 2} and m ∈ {1, ...,K}. We know that z1, ..., zK all deliver











− zk (k = 1, ...,K; j 6= i). (3)
Thus, there are K equations to identify (K + 1) unknowns p1j , ..., p
K
j and




j = 1 does not help in general.
Instead, we focus on the largest element of the support of player i’s equi-
librium strategy.2 Since K ≥ 2, we know that z1 is an interior maximum.
1 If attention is restricted to strategies that are absolutely continuous with respect to
the Lebesgue measure, the use of complex-analytic methods may be circumvented (Sun,
2017).
2The first-named author would like to thank Larry Samuelson for this suggestion.
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· · · exp(αzK)exp(αzK)+exp(αzK) 1
α exp(αz1) exp(αz1)
(exp(αz1)+exp(αz1))2






















It turns out that (5) has at most one solution.
Lemma 3. The square matrix on the left-hand side of (5) is invertible.


















































· · · (eK−e1)eK(eK+eK)(e1+eK) 0
αe1e1
(e1+e1)2






Next, we extract the factor em/(e1 + em) > 0 from column m, for m =
1, ...,K, and the factor (ek − e1) > 0 from row k, for k = 2, ...,K. Further,


























































Finally, we exchange row 1 and row K + 1. Therefore, detA3 = −detA4,











This proves the lemma. 
Recall that the support of any equilibrium is contained in Xα = {z1, ..., zK}.
Hence, with probabilities p1j , ..., p
K
j being unique, there can indeed be at most
one equilibrium.
4. Characterization3
Since the Hirshleifer contest with parameter α > 0 admits only one equilib-
rium, the two players necessarily use the same equilibrium strategy µα ∈M .
The following result characterizes µα.
Proposition 2. Let α > 0. Then, the following properties hold:
(i) µα has finite support {y1, ..., yL}, where y1 > ... > yL, with L ≥
α
4 .
(ii) µα has a mass point at the zero bid, i.e., yL = 0.
(iii) there is two-sided peace4 (i.e., L = 1) if and only if α ≤ 4.
3This section and the next supersede the corresponding parts of earlier work by the
authors (Ewerhart, 2014; Sun, 2017).
4Two-sided peace (Hirshleifer, 1989) refers to the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in
which both contestants choose a zero resource commitment.
4
Proof. (i) By Lemma 1, the support of µα is finite. Denote by qm =













(l = 1, ..., L), (11)
with equality for l = 1, ..., L−1, so that ql ≤ 4α for any l = 1, ..., L. Therefore,
L ≥ α4 . (ii) For L = 1, the claim is due to Hirshleifer (1989). Suppose next












which shows that yL cannot be an interior maximum. Hence, yL = 0. (iii)
Hirshleifer (1989) has shown that x∗1 = x
∗
2 = 0 is a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium for α ≤ 4. For α > 4, however, part (i) implies L ≥ 2. 
Example (L = 2). Consider an equilibrium strategy µα that places prob-












This equilibrium exists numerically for α ∈ (4, 6.79).5
5The implicit value for y1 may be characterized alternatively in terms of the r-Lambert
function (Mesö and Baricz, 2017).
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5. Rent dissipation
Rent dissipation is always incomplete in the Hirshleifer contest.6 For α →
∞, however, the equilibrium payoff Π∗ goes to zero, as the following result
shows.





























Since ∂Πi(0, µα)/∂xi ≤ 0, the claim follows. 
Figure 1 outlines the equilibrium payoff Π∗ and its upper bound as a function
of α. Note that Π∗, contrary to intuition, is not globally declining. For
example, if α = 6.1 (< 6.6), the equilibrium is given by y1 = 0.4337 (0.4517),
q1 = 0.5425 (0.5173), and Π∗ = 0.2646 (< 0.2662). Thus, the increase in y1
is more than compensated by a decline in q1.
6This fact contrasts, of course, with the complete rent dissipation pervasive in suffi-
ciently decisive contests of the ratio form (Baye et al., 1994; Alcade and Dahm, 2010;
Ewerhart, 2015, 2017a).
6
Figure 1. Undissipated rent as a function of α.
6. Ex-post overdissipation
Although rent dissipation is less severe than in the Tullock case, the Hirsh-
leifer contest may nevertheless feature ex-post overdissipation, i.e., the sum
of realized bids may exceed the value of the prize with positive probability
(cf. Baye et al., 1999).
















































Using (23) in (24) yields the claim. 
Proposition 4 implies that ex-post overdissipation occurs for any sufficiently
large α. Using numerical analysis, we verified that y1 > 0.5 holds for α > 7.2.
7. Alternative contest technologies
Consider a contest technology of the form




where h > 0 is a positive impact function (as in Neary, 1997). Provided
that h admits, in addition, a real-analytic extension to (−ε,∞), for some
ε > 0, the uniqueness argument goes through. In that case, however, the
equilibrium need no longer possess a mass point at the origin.7
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